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Abstract 
Digital engineering changes how systems are acquired and developed through the 
use of model-centric practices and toolsets. Enterprises face new challenges in this 
transformation, including potential for emergent vulnerabilities within digital engineering 
environments. While vulnerability analysis of products and systems is standard practice, 
examining vulnerabilities within the enterprise itself is less common. This research is 
responsive to the imperatives of the newly released DoD Digital Engineering Strategy that 
calls for enterprises to mitigate cyber risks and secure digital engineering environments 
against attacks from internal and external threats, mitigate known vulnerabilities that 
present high risk to DoD networks and data, and to mitigate risk posed by collaboration 
and access to vast amount of information in models. This paper presents progress on the 
ongoing research that focuses on uncovering cascading vulnerabilities as related to digital 
engineering practice and supporting environments, with special focus on cybersecurity-
related vulnerabilities. The approach uses Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) as a mechanism 
for better enabling program leaders to anticipate and respond to vulnerabilities within the 
enterprise. The current investigation is examining enterprise-level vulnerabilities and 
investigating potential interventions. 
Introduction 
Vulnerability assessment of products and systems has been actively investigated in 
recent years, resulting in a family of useful techniques now commonly accepted as good 
practice (LeSaint, Reed, & Popick, 2015). The assessment of vulnerabilities within the 
enterprises performing engineering has received relatively little attention. While many of the 
existing techniques for systems vulnerability assessment will still be useful, some adaptation 
and additional techniques are necessary. The urgency of investigating this has increased as 
a result of digital engineering transformation as it changes how systems are acquired and 
developed through the use of model-centric engineering practices and new types of 
environments within the enterprise.  
Ongoing research has investigated the use of Cause-Effect Mapping as a 
mechanism for better enabling program leaders to anticipate and respond to vulnerabilities 
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as related to model-centric enterprises and their enabling environments (Mekdeci et al., 
2012; Rovito & Rhodes, 2016; Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). A Reference Cause-Effect Map 
(CEM) for model-centric enterprises resulting from the work to date shows promise for 
considering the cascading vulnerabilities and potential intervention options. In the continuing 
investigation, the Reference CEM and other analytic techniques are being further developed 
and evaluated. Intervention approaches are being identified and mapped to cascading 
vulnerability chains, providing options for mitigation. 
Background 
Background is provided in the following subsections to characterize digital 
engineering and model-centric enterprises. Prior research papers (Reid & Rhodes, 2018a, 
2018b) provide additional background information. 
Digital Engineering (Model-Centric Engineering) 
Digital engineering (sometimes referred to as model-centric engineering) involves 
using integrated models across disciplines, subsystems, lifecycle stages, and analyst 
groups. It uses models as “authoritative source of truth,” to reduce document handoff and 
allow for more continuous evaluation. By collaborating through models, there is reduced 
communication time and rework in response to requirement changes. Most discussions to 
date focus on engineering practices and methods to overcome implementation difficulties. In 
any system, however, non-technical factors (human factors, business, and organizational) 
influence engineering effectiveness and model-centric decisions (Reid & Rhodes, 2017; 
German & Rhodes, 2017).  
Current program leaders have significant experience with processes for acquiring 
and developing systems, and use this experience to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. 
Limited experience exists with digital engineering practice and model-centric supporting 
environments, however. This situation, coupled with the increased model integration and 
model longevity, means that emergent uncertainties (policy change, budget cuts, disruptive 
technologies, threats, changing demographics, etc.) and related programmatic decisions 
(e.g., staff cuts, reduced training hours) may lead to cascading vulnerabilities within digital 
engineering enterprises, potentially jeopardizing program success. New practices and 
enablers are needed to assist program leaders in identifying vulnerabilities within the digital 
engineering environment, and to determine where interventions can most effectively be 
taken. 
Model-Centric Environments 
Model-centric environments have many elements, including computing infrastructure, 
networks, software tools, models, data sets, data storage, and human actors. These 
environments may come under attack from internal and/or external threats. Some of these 
elements exist in traditional engineering, but some are new or changed under digital 
engineering practice (Reid & Rhodes, 2016). New modes of collaboration through models 
and data are emerging. The quantity of and types of models, digital artifacts, and data has 
greatly increased. Collaboration between the many enterprises involved through digital 
engineering (government agencies, contractors, suppliers, etc.) results in significant 
increases in data flowing across networks. As new toolsets are introduced into enterprise, 
there are potential risks related to how proficient the workforce is in using these tools and 
whether there are sufficient controls in place in the management of the digital artifacts 
produced, as well as the overall supporting infrastructure. The DoD Digital Engineering 
Strategy (2018) calls for the mitigation of these risks and vulnerabilities (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  DoD Digital Engineering Strategy Calls for Mitigation of Risks and 
Vulnerabilities 
(DoD, 2018) 
Vulnerabilities as Causal Chains 
Vulnerabilities are effectively expressed as the causal series of events connecting a 
hazard to the system and/or failure that results. Cause-Effect Mapping is a vulnerability 
assessment approach that consists of a mapping of causal chains that connect an 
exogenous hazard to a system degradation or failure, termed a terminal event (Mekdeci et 
al., 2012). Terminal events are broadly defined and include any form of value loss. A casual 
chain can be defined as a series of events, with each event causing or being an integral part 
of the cause, or the next link in the chain. A hazard (spontaneous event) is a system or 
environmental state that has the potential to disrupt the system. A vulnerability is defined as 
causal means by which one or more hazards results in the system disruption/value loss. 
Accordingly, a vulnerability chain is defined as a conceptualization and representation of 
vulnerability as a causal chain, emphasizing that vulnerabilities are not discrete events. 
Vignette 
Figure 2 shows a very simple example of a vulnerability chain, where an external 
trigger disrupts effectiveness of engineering activities, as triggered by increased cost of the 
commercial software used by the enterprise. This is illustrative of how a rather simple 
external change may cascade into interim impacts, and ultimately lead to a failure later in 
the program. 
 
Figure 2. Example Vulnerability Chain With Intervention Point (in Blue) 
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Describing this as a vignette, the vulnerability is as follows: 
A particular piece of simulation software that your company has used on 
similar projects in the past is licensed from commercial software vendor. 
The license contract is up for renewal soon and the price goes up 
significantly. This could result in the preferred modeling software being 
unavailable for use in this program leading to the selection of an alternate 
software tool that the team has less (or no) experience with. Due to this 
lack of experience with the new software, assumptions underlying the 
model may be misunderstood by analysts and thus inaccurate simulation 
results are generated. This may not be noticed until either verification or 
validation when the system or subsystem does not behave according to the 
predicted performance levels. 
One identified intervention point is shown in the blue box in Figure 2. Executing this 
intervention would require that program leadership recognizes when the external trigger is 
imminent or occurring and act quickly to avoid loss of modeling capability. Alternately, there 
may be other points of intervention along the chain. While this analysis is quite simple, more 
sophisticated applications of graph theory and probabilistic modeling can be conducted 
using a well-developed Reference CEM. For instance, if probabilities, likelihoods, or time 
scales of each event transition are known, techniques such as Markov Chain Modeling, 
Monte Carlo Analysis, and Bayesian Networks can be brought to bear, weighting each arc of 
the graph instead of treating them equally (Reid, 2018). 
Cause-Effect Mapping 
Cause-Effect Mapping (CEM) has been demonstrated as a useful approach to 
vulnerability analysis for systems, programs and enterprises (Mekdeci et al., 2012; Rovito & 
Rhodes, 2016; Reid & Rhodes, 2018a, 2018b). An example CEM for a supply chain case 
vulnerability assessment (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) is shown in Figure 3. The hazards are 
external to the perspective of the defined user, and are thus sometimes called external 
triggers. An intermediary event is any unintended state change of a system’s form or 
operations which could jeopardize value delivery of the program and/or enterprise. 
Interventions are actions that eliminate or mitigate a vulnerability to break the causal chain.  
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Figure 3. Example CEM of a Supply Chain 
(Rovito & Rhodes, 2016) 
A CEM is created for a specific class of decision-maker (e.g., program manager). 
The hazards (referred to as “spontaneous events”) are exogenous from the point of view of 
the decision-maker for which the CEM was constructed. In this way, the cause-effect 
mapping approach avoids “blaming someone else” by making all hazards exogenous. The 
decision-maker has control over only the intermediary events. While not necessarily at fault 
for any of the vulnerabilities, the decision maker has the responsibility and authority to 
choose if, and how, to address these. 
As shown in Figure 4, a causal chain may have multiple points for breaking the 
chain, for instance to correct weak security controls and/or to prevent unauthorized access. 
The first might be a policy/process intervention and the latter might be a technology 
intervention. The decision to execute one/both of the interventions will depend upon unique 
factors, such as the cost to implement, color of money available, specifics of the situation, 
and so forth.  
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Figure 4. Example of Two Alternative Placements for an Intervention in Causal 
Chain 
The basic steps to create a new CEM are not application specific and are detailed in 
Rovito and Rhodes (2016) and Reid and Rhodes (2018b). The stakeholder generates the 
CEM (or tailors a Reference CEM) by listing potential hazards posed to the program and 
then traces the consequences of each of these hazards through the intermediary events to 
the final terminal events. The process is then done in reverse: taking the terminal events, 
adding in any that are still missing, and working backwards on how these might come about. 
The causal connections between each intermediary event are examined to see if there are 
any additional connections not previously noticed. Finally, lessons learned databases, case 
studies, and other experts are consulted to generate additional hazards, intermediary 
events, causal connections, and interventions, as well as to verify existing ones. It is 
envisioned that any of these steps can take place either formally, using automated tools to 
enumerate possible vulnerabilities, or informally, relying upon the stakeholder’s own 
experience. CEM is fundamentally a qualitative analysis method, though it can be readily 
adapted into a more quantitative form, by specifying probabilities of transition to each 
intermediary (Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). 
CEM has previously been applied in a case study of a Maritime Security System of 
Systems (Mekdeci et al., 2012) and to a supply chain case (Rovito & Rhodes, 2016). More 
recently, an earlier phase of this research developed a Reference CEM for use by program 
managers to assess enterprise-level vulnerabilities in the digital engineering/model-centric 
environment (Reid & Rhodes, 2018b). This work, which was based upon literature reviews, 
interviews with experts, and other sources, sought to provide program leaders with an entry 
point into for considering such vulnerabilities. Potential use cases are discussed in Reid and 
Rhodes (2018b). Key benefits include increased understanding of the causal path and the 
interrelationships between vulnerabilities. 
Cause-Effect Map for Model-Centric Programs and Enterprises 
CEM provides an effective way to describe cascading vulnerabilities within a digital 
engineering enterprise. Figure 5 shows the Reference CEM generated in this research using 
literature reviews and interviews with experts, among other sources. Nineteen intervention 
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points are identified as potential opportunities for breaking causal chains that may be 
triggered by external events.  
 
Figure 5. Reference Cause-Effect Map 
(Reid, 2018) 
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External triggers that result in similar vulnerability chains are grouped together in the 
map. By “similar,” we mean that these vulnerability chains either involve many of the same 
intermediary events or that they involve the same part of the program. For this map, the 
external triggers were classified into three different domains, defined as follows: 
 Force Majeure (red boxes): This is a general term for an event that is the result of 
actions beyond the possibility of the program enterprise (not just the program 
manager) to influence. Thus it includes both malicious action and general, 
unforeseeable events such as Technological Change. 
 Policy (green boxes): An event that is the result of intentional decisions made at 
the organizational or enterprise level. In the case of a government-run program, 
this includes oversight from Congress and the general public. Non-government 
organizations may still be impacted indirectly by such oversight, but their 
proximal triggering event would be different.  
 Private Sector (orange boxes): Any event that is the result of the actions of one 
or more private-sector firms outside the program enterprise. 
The purple boxes are the terminal events. 
The intervention points on the Reference CEM (Figure 5) are shown in Table 1, 
where an invention action is defined for each point.  
Table 1. Intervention Points for the Reference CEM Shown in Figure 5 
(Reid, 2018) 
Point # Intervention Action 
1 Initiate internal assessment and a public relations strategy 
2 
Initiate various non-monetary benefits (e.g., 9/80 schedule) to encourage employees to 
stay 
3 Seek to share resources and employees with other programs 
4 Hire employees with prior experience with the new software 
5 Compartmentalize sensitive information 
6 Obfuscate sensitive data with false or misleading information 
7 Create documentation and curation processes within the program  
8 Institute handover periods to benefit from contractor expertise 
9 Reevaluate the training regime and needed fields of expertise 
10 Increase the amount of testing conducted 
11 Increase use of contractors/consultants to maintain expertise level 
12 Reevaluate the requirements with the client and other stakeholders 
13 Design for modularity to minimize impact on system 
14 Negotiate with client/end-user to see if they are able to pay for the software 
15 Maintain isolated but readily accessible back-ups of data 
16 Conduct reviews/comparisons of models between lifecycle stages 
17 Use multiple independent simulations or component checkers 
18 
Maintain isolated, independent backup equipment while primary equipment is 
evaluated 
19 Conduct regular “red-team”/penetration test exercises 
 
Observations on Intervention Points 
Reid (2018) found that intervention points identified in the Reference CEM (Figure 5) 
tend to be in the first half of the vulnerability chains, with several immediately after an 
external trigger. This suggests the need for monitoring for potential or imminent external 
triggers and being ready to respond as soon as, or even in advance of, their manifestation.  
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The Reference CEM can be used to guide the attention to various vulnerabilities. For 
instance, it should be noted that within the “active modeling” set of intermediate events 
(inside the blue box of Figure 6) there are relatively few intervention points identified, despite 
the high number of vulnerability chains that pass through that section of the Reference 
CEM. The primary intervention point identified in that section, number 7, is “Create 
documentation and curation processes within the program” (see Table 1). 
This relative lack of intervention points may represent the unfamiliarity of program 
leaders with digital engineering processes and how to intervene in them. This suggests that 
further work would be useful in identifying potential interventions in this section of the map 




Figure 6. Excerpt of the Reference CEM Highlighting the “Active Modeling” 
Portion 
(Reid, 2018) 
While this portion of the chain has one intervention identified, certain vulnerability 
chains have multiple intervention points identified at multiple stages. For instance, several of 
the vulnerability chains that pass through the Needs Change event have three intervention 
points each (and the others have at least two), as shown in Figure 5. 
According to Reid (2018), this suggests there may not be as much of a concern 
about these vulnerabilities, due to the multiple options of intervention available and the fact 
that several are positioned multiple events into the chain, giving significant time for 
response. 
An experienced program leader will find some of the listed intervention points to be 
common sense. For instance, one of the interventions (number 12) following the Needs 
Change event (see Table 1) is “Reevaluate requirements with the client and other 
stakeholders.” This degree of occasional obviousness is not unique to CEM but is true of all 
vulnerability assessment techniques. The point of these techniques is not just to identify new 
vulnerabilities and interventions, but to consistently track and assess them so that all options 
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are available. A case in point is that even experienced pilots still use a checklist (and 
surgeons really should be; Haynes, Berry, and Gawande, 2015).  
It should be noted that the Reference CEM shown in this paper does omit 
vulnerabilities and interventions that are entirely unchanged. For example, practices like the 
security clearance system and restricting the use of digital storage media will remain 
necessary, effective interventions that are not significantly impacted by MCE environments. 
Some historically successful methods may be conflict with MCE environments, for example, 
the use of SCIFs has been quite successful in preventing unauthorized access to data. The 
typical use of a SCIF in design, where a small number of engineers work on a task isolated 
from the outside world, is not directly compatible with an MCE environment structured 
around model integration and collaboration across teams and locations. While this problem 
has been previously considered and ways to mitigate this conflict have been proposed (e.g., 
Reid & Rhodes, 2016), no silver bullet to resolving these tensions exists and it is likely that 
the increased use of MCE will result in both the exacerbation of some current vulnerabilities 
and the creation of new ones. 
Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities 
Literature review and interview-based research have provided useful insights 
throughout the research. As the initial research progressed, the importance and urgency of 
considering the cybersecurity vulnerabilities shaped the second phase of study to focus 
more specifically on these. Reid (2018) conducted interviews with systems engineers and 
program managers from a variety of fields, including defense, aerospace, manufacturing, 
and semiconductors. The interviews explored these program cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
general, and in context of model-centric approaches. Four issues commonly were cited: 
 Cybersecurity needs to be thoroughly considered much earlier than it commonly 
is, preferably in the proposal generation stage. 
 Program managers and systems engineers are sometimes intimidated by 
cybersecurity issues and thus seek to pass them onto specialists later in the 
acquisition process. 
 MBSE and MCE toolset developers and proponents have not done a thorough 
enough job of considering programmatic cybersecurity vulnerabilities, though the 
tools are thought to be quite effective at designing for cybersecurity in regard to 
end-systems. 
 Traditional programmatic cybersecurity defensive practices tends to quite 
effective in traditional engineering programs, but the increased use of MCE, 
particularly for multi-site collaboration, could change this (Reid & Rhodes, 
2018a). 
Non-Technical Influences and Impacts 
One set of vulnerabilities that came up repeatedly in both the interviews and 
experiment sessions in our research (Reid & Rhodes, 2018a) were those that passed 
through the reputation harm intermediate event, as shown in Figure 7. 
Despite the frequency that the potential for this vulnerability was raised by experts, 
few interventions were proposed for post-breach. According to Reid (2018), this suggests 
that leaders of digital engineering enterprises may need better understanding of potential 
vulnerabilities leading to breaches in context of digital engineering, as well as more 
knowledge on how to respond to breaches, particularly prominent ones, instead of solely 
how to prevent them. While there is evidence in the private sector suggesting that the 
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reputation harm incurred by a prominent breach does not significantly impact the firm 
(Lange & Burger, 2017), contractors to the government are known to suffer significant 
financial penalties due to breaches, even when such a breach is unrelated to their 
government duties (Braun, 2014; Overly, 2017). In a defense acquisition environment, there 
is thus significant incentive to having program leadership (and the enterprise as a whole) 
well-prepared to respond to major breaches. 
 
 
Figure 7. Reputation Harm Vulnerabilities 
(Reid, 2018) 
Relevant Research From Other Fields 
Huff, Medal, and Griendling (2018) present a methodology for performing 
vulnerability assessment and decision analysis of critical infrastructure using the approach 
of model-based systems engineering. The work focuses on physical security of critical 
infrastructure. Some of their findings may provide useful insights for vulnerability 
assessment of infrastructure within model-centric enterprises.  
The literature on the manufacturing sector offers interesting observations and new 
research of relevance to vulnerability assessment of model-centric enterprise environments. 
Burnson (2017), discussing a recent Deloitte study on cyber vulnerabilities in manufacturing 
supply chains, states “one-third of all manufacturers sampled admitted to not having 
performed any cyber risk assessments of the industrial connected devices operating on 
factory floors.” While data is not available, from discussions with experts in the engineering 
domain, it seems likely that there would be a similar situation in regard to whether cyber risk 
assessments have been performed for model-centric engineering environments with 
connected hardware and software. 
DeSmit et al. (2016) discuss research on cyber-physical vulnerability assessment in 
manufacturing systems that uses an approach that employs intersection mapping. 
According to these authors, “no literature is aimed at assessing cyber-physical vulnerabilities 
for manufacturing systems.” With similarities of manufacturing facilities with facilities used in 
model-centric enterprises, their research may offer useful insights to our research. DeSmit et 
al. (2016) describe their approach as “based on the principle that vulnerabilities in 
manufacturing systems occur at intersections (and intra-sections, referred to collectively as 
intersections) of cyber, physical, cyber-physica,l and human entities that embody a 
manufacturing system.” Similar to the CEM approach, their method maps intersections and 
assesses the impact at intersection nodes. They evaluate five characteristics: loss of 
information, inconsistency, relative frequency, lack of maturity, and time until detection. In 
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their method, vulnerability impact assessment (Low, Medium High) is assessed for the 
characteristics at each of the nodes. This offers an interesting approach to qualitative 
assessment measures for vulnerability. Another noteworthy facet of their work that 
resonates with our research is that human entities are included in defining intersections. 
Discussion 
Knowledge gathered in this research indicates that program leaders do not formally 
grapple with vulnerabilities within the program and overall enterprise to the extent they do 
with vulnerabilities related to the end-system. Cause-Effect Mapping, with re-conceptualizing 
vulnerabilities as causal chains, enables program and enterprise leaders to identify 
connections, categories, and potential interventions in the vulnerability chains. The research 
indicates identifying external triggers and representing vulnerabilities as chains enables a 
more detailed assessment of how interim cascading events can result in significant terminal 
outcomes. Use of the CEM approach assists in understanding these causal chains, and 
decomposes a vulnerability in a manner that encourages finding multiple options for 
mitigation. Particular choices for disrupting a harmful causal chain are useful for considering 
where and when to place interventions based on the specific nature of the situation. 
Limitations 
While a fully-developed generalized CEM Reference Map could provide overall 
benefit to digital engineering programs, the fact that enterprise and programs are unique 
makes it difficult to accomplish this without much more extensive application and study. 
Secondly, digital engineering practice and supporting infrastructure are still evolving, so 
limited knowledge exists at present. Nonetheless, programs and enterprises may derive 
significant benefit by the activity of constructing a reference map for their unique situation. 
The process of generating the map invokes thoughtful discussion and anticipating potential 
hazards that may have been introduced as a result of the digital transformation. The 
approach of considering vulnerabilities as casual chains yields rich discussion, regardless of 
whether an overall map is developed. This research has demonstrated the approach to 
constructing a CEM Reference Map and illustrates content included in the map; a fully-
developed comprehensive reference map will require a more extensive investigation. 
Research Directions 
There are several areas of desired future research direction. First, additional study is 
needed on leading indicators of vulnerability in digital engineering enterprises, along with 
potential mitigation strategies. Specific approaches to quantification of interventions in 
breaking vulnerability causal chains is desired, as related to cost, benefit, importance, 
frequency, etc. Additional research on dynamic simulation using System Dynamics (SD) with 
CEM is a promising area to explore given the complexities that will be inherent in a fully 
populated reference CEM (further discussion is found in Reid, 2018). Implementation of an 
interactive method used to perform vulnerability assessment using a reference map is a 
future area of inquiry. Additional research is needed to identify relevant investigation in the 
systems engineering field; for example, Wach and Salado (2018) describe a plan to discover 
patterns of unknown vulnerabilities associated with SysML. And, further collaborative 
research with government and industry is desired to identify additional vulnerability chains 
and enable testing and scaling the method. 
Summary 
In summary, digital engineering transformation naturally introduces new 
vulnerabilities within programs and enterprises. Causal chains provide a useful way to 
understand how external triggers lead to cascading intermediate events that result in 
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specific outcomes. Understanding a vulnerability chain provides program leaders with 
increased knowledge and options for inserting interventions to avoid undesired vulnerability 
outcomes. With more experience and knowledge of vulnerabilities inherent in digital 
engineering practice and infrastructure, the systems community may find it valuable to 
establish a generalized Reference CEM that can guide future programs and enterprises to 
assess and manage vulnerabilities, leading to more successful program outcomes. Related 
research on model curation views a CEM Reference Map as an enabling tool (Rhodes, 
2019) for vulnerability assessment of enterprises. 
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